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In many contemporary armed conflicts, belligerent parties 
fight not only on the battlefield, but also on the diplomatic 
front in the world’s capitals. In Washington and other US 
cities, warring groups often hire high-profile public 
relations professionals in order to gain access to US 
policymakers and influence policy. This brief uses the 
ongoing conflict in Libya to illustrate the foreign war 
lobby in the United States and examine why fighting 
groups hire American lobbyists, far from the war front.  
While war rages in Libya, the country’s main belligerent par-
ties have been waging a different kind of battle against one 
another in the United States. Here, they have hired American 
law firms and PR professionals to help them lobby the US gov-
ernment. How and why do foreign governments and their 
armed opponents engage in lobbying in the United States?   
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
The Libyan war lobby is just one 
example of how foreign 
governments and their armed 
opponents both actively lobby 
the US government. 
Millions of dollars are spent each 
year on US law firms and PR 
companies by foreign 
governments and rebel groups.  
There is little systematic data on 
the extent of conflict lobbying.  
The Libyan case illustrates that 
foreign lobbying is significant and 
deserves more attention from 
academics and policymakers.  
 
2 
THE LIBYAN WAR 
The current war in Libya has origins in the 
popular uprisings that erupted in early 2011 
as part of the widespread demonstrations 
against entrenched autocrats across the Mid-
dle East and North Africa. When Libyans pro-
tested en masse against Col. Muammar Gadda-
fi and his regime that spring, NATO forces 
took the opportunity to intervene with air-
power and ensure his removal, bringing to an 
end over four decades of his dictatorial rule.  
But the overthrow of Gaddafi created a power 
vacuum in Libya, an outcome NATO powers 
chose to ignore. Predictably, a number of mili-
tant groups began to fight for territorial con-
trol. Amidst the ensuing chaos the UN sup-
ported a political agreement in 2015 that des-
ignated the Government of National Accord 
(GNA) as Libya’s interim government. Howev-
er, the GNA barely functioned as a govern-
ment and was not national in any sense, and 
the accord that brought it into being quickly 
shattered.  
The self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), 
led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, soon 
emerged as the most powerful armed con-
tender to the GNA. The war took on a new 
sense of urgency in April 2019 when Haftar’s 
forces launched a campaign to seize the capi-
tal, Tripoli, bombarding civilian targets in the 
process.1 
As is typical of contemporary conflicts, nu-
merous external states have asserted a role in 
this war, backing one side or the other with 
shipments of weapons, fighters, and funds. 
Haftar’s LNA has received support from Rus-
sia, France, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, while Turkey sent 
troops from the Syrian opposition to fight on 
the side of the GNA’s internationally recog-
nized government.2  
THE FOREIGN WAR LOBBIES  
Far from Libya, the warring parties have been 
fighting not an armed contest, but a political 
one in Washington. The United States has so 
far played a muted role in the Libyan war, 
nominally aligning itself with the GNA. Never-
theless, with control of Tripoli itself up for 
grabs and Arab and European states’ heavy 
backing of the rebel LNA, both sides see the 
potential payoffs of developing strong ties 
with American officials and lawmakers in 
preparation for any eventuality.  
Lobbying by Libya’s internationally recog-
nized government is par for the course in US 
politics; many dozens of foreign governments 
spend millions of dollars a year hiring Ameri-
can law firms and PR companies to lobby the 
executive and legislative branches.3 In lobby-
ing—inserting themselves into the US policy-
making process—foreign governments are 
taking advantage of democratic freedoms en-
shrined in the First Amendment. Lobbying 
allows foreign actors greater influence in poli-
cy debates and helps them build relations 
with individual lawmakers and government 
offices. Ultimately, it is a way for foreign gov-
ernments to attempt to steer US policies in 
their favor.  
Foreign rebel groups also lobby in the United 
States while engaged in armed campaigns 
against their home governments. Like their 
government counterparts, they hire American 
PR companies—specialists in the influence 
game who typically have close connections 
with (or formerly held offices in) the US gov-
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ernment—to represent their interests in Con-
gress, in the White House, and with other poli-
cy audiences.  
Whether they represent foreign states or re-
bels, lobbyists must regularly disclose their 
work to the US Justice Department as mandat-
ed by the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
(FARA) and other US lobbying laws. Conflict 
lobbying data, however, are inadequately col-
lected, difficult to analyze, and sometimes 
nonexistent, particularly for rebel groups. 
DIPLOMACY AND COUNTER-DIPLOMACY 
IN THE LIBYAN CONFLICT  
As part of the Libyan war, the GNA has 
worked with at least two American PR compa-
nies over the past year to lobby Congress and 
the Trump administration, with contracts to-
taling $3.5 million for the year.4 The GNA’s 
statements, issued by their American PR 
agents, advance arguments one might expect 
from an internationally-recognized govern-
ment seeking to fend off armed challengers:  
“The GNA is the legitimate govern-
ment and the only body authorized in 
Libya to consolidate military alliances 
necessary to defend the state, its insti-
tutions, and its citizens…. The goal of 
the GNA is to defeat the aggression [by 
Haftar’s forces], eliminate the coup 
project, return Libya to a peaceful 
democratic constitutional path, and 
restore security and stability.”5  
They also dangle the Libyan war as an oppor-
tunity for the Trump administration to make 
its mark in the foreign policy sphere: 
“Only the Trump administration has 
clean hands in Libya…since European 
and Gulf powers are feeding the con-
flict through their continued support 
for renegade warlord Khalifa Haftar. 
President Trump can call out the hy-
pocrisy of these outsiders and apply 
real pressure…. Previous US admin-
istrations and foreign powers have 
exploited and failed Libya, and now 
it’s clear that only Donald Trump can 
get the process back on track.”6  
In a classic lobbying tactic, they also stress the 
dire consequences—here with geopolitical 
intonations—of American failure to back the 
GNA: 
“Is the administration concerned that 
if Hafter succeeds, Russia will gain 
access to two more deep water ports 
in Libya facing Europe, besides the 
one they now have in Syria?”7  
Haftar and the LNA, for their part, have en-
gaged in counter-diplomacy by hiring their 
own lobbyists in the United States in 2019.8 
While the GNA currently has the clear upper 
hand in the battle for international diplomatic 
recognition, the empirical reality is that the 
LNA now controls most of Libya, including the 
country’s largest oil field.9 Given this, the re-
bels have adopted a different marketing tactic 
from that used by the GNA, stressing their cre-
dentials in exploiting Libya’s vast oil reserves. 
Their chosen PR firm, based in Houston, is 
known for its experience in the international 
energy market, and its staff have disclosed 
meetings with high-level American officials in 
charge of energy policy over the past year.10 
The LNA’s lobbying efforts are likely motivat-
ed in part by the possibility that international 
recognition can shift in the future, depending 
on war dynamics on the ground, particularly 
the outcome of the ongoing battle for Tripoli.  
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IMPLICATIONS 
The Libya case illustrates the extent to which 
international diplomacy can be part and parcel 
of civil conflicts. When states and rebels fight 
not just for territorial control and battlefield 
victories but also for international recognition 
and future business investments, the diplomat-
ic front can sometimes overtake local war dy-
namics in its impact on the ultimate war out-
come. Lobbying contests also demonstrate the 
internationalized nature of contemporary con-
flicts. Local actors may be the main fighters, but 
they are backed by regional and international 
powers in complex configurations of proxy 
warfare that reflect various states’ geopolitical 
and regional interests of the day.  
The war lobby certainly raises ethical questions 
about the confluence of foreign wars, PR com-
panies’ profit motives, and US foreign policy 
decisions.11 Regardless, given that violent con-
flicts often have far-reaching repercussions on 
international politics, and in light of the in-
creasing importance of image-marketing in the 
social media age, the war lobby can be expected 
to remain a major feature of violent conflicts to 
come.  
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